Deconstructing the Paradox of the Constitutional Incarceration of Innocent Citizens by Charles, Rebecca
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 85 Issue 1 Article 10 
Winter 2020 
Deconstructing the Paradox of the Constitutional Incarceration of 
Innocent Citizens 
Rebecca Charles 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rebecca Charles, Deconstructing the Paradox of the Constitutional Incarceration of Innocent Citizens, 85 
MO. L. REV. (2020) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 




Deconstructing the Paradox of the 
Constitutional Incarceration of Innocent 
Citizens 
In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) transfer denied. 
Rebecca Charles* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Missouri is not sure whether it is a manifest injustice or a violation of 
due process to continue incarcerating an innocent person, even for life.1  This 
is a shocking notion for average citizens who expect the criminal justice 
system to exact justice accurately and fairly.  Much of judicial precedent is 
not entirely intuitive to ordinary citizens, and yet lawful incarceration of 
innocents is a paradox that moves beyond unintuitive to alarming.  Rodney 
Lincoln’s story epitomizes many of the most alarming aspects of this paradox.  
In 1985, Rodney Lincoln was convicted of the brutal assault of two 
young girls and the murder and assault of their mother.2  In the more than 
thirty years following his convictions, the already feeble evidence used to 
incarcerate Mr. Lincoln crumbled.3  With no evidence remaining to support 
his conviction, Mr. Lincoln petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge 
his continued detention.4  He was unsuccessful.5  The Missouri Court of 
Appeals for the Western District denied Mr. Lincoln’s petition, perpetuating 
the convoluted and flawed precedent that governs the legal procedures of 
habeas corpus.6  
 
*  B.A., Truman State University, 2006; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2020; Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2018–2019.  I am 
grateful to Professor Uphoff for his insight, guidance, and support during the writing 
of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process. 
 1. See In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11, 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). 
 2. Id. at 15.  
 3. Id. at 15–16.  
 4. Id. at 16.  
 5. Id. at 15.  
 6. Id. at 23. 
1
Charles: Deconstructing the Paradox
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
248 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
Habeas corpus is a procedural safeguard that allows an individual 
detained by a government to challenge the legitimacy of his detention.7  While 
the exact parameters of habeas corpus vary across jurisdictions, its common 
underlying premise provides for release of a detainee when his detention 
violates the law.8  No court binding the Missouri Court of Appeals has ever 
determined that the incarceration of an innocent person is unlawful.   
While plenty of precedent exists to conclude that such a detention 
violates fundamental fairness, the Western District in In re Lincoln v. Cassady 
was unwilling to make such a finding without the prior blessing of the 
Supreme Court of Missouri.9  As a result, there is no procedural pathway for 
a convicted and incarcerated person sentenced to anything short of death to 
convincingly demonstrate his innocence and obtain relief under Missouri law.  
For Mr. Lincoln, who received two consecutive life sentences plus fifteen 
years, this lack of a procedural pathway made the absence of evidence 
remaining to support his conviction irrelevant.10  
Courts upholding the position that habeas corpus cannot remedy the 
incarceration of an innocent person flaunt finality as a compelling justification 
for denying relief.11  Respect for the finality of judgments and convictions 
lends stability, efficiency, and legitimacy to the courts.  But finality is an 
unconvincing justification for affirming a conviction when the convicted is 
ready and able to prove his innocence.  Courts also rely on executive clemency 
to clean up the injustice that results from this position.  As the chief executives 
of their jurisdictions, governors have statutory authority to grant pardons and 
commute sentences through clemency.  But clemency is an ineffective 
solution when examined critically against the massive injustice that results 
from wrongful convictions left undisturbed. 
Part II of this Note explains the facts and procedural background of 
Rodney Lincoln’s convictions for manslaughter and two counts of first-degree 
assault.  Part III outlines the legal background relevant to the court’s ruling, 
including the expansion of habeas corpus to freestanding claims of actual 
innocence and the inapplicability of that expansion to non-death penalty cases.  
Part IV details the court’s ruling in Mr. Lincoln’s case, which acknowledged 
Mr. Lincoln’s compelling case of innocence but could not grant habeas relief 
due to procedural barriers.  Part V explains the insufficiency of finality as a 
justification for perpetuating the procedural barriers to habeas relief and the 
inadequacy of the court-endorsed remedy of executive clemency to cure the 
consequences of those barriers.  It then offers concrete solutions to the 
 
 7. Id. at 16 (citing State ex rel Amrine v Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 545–46 (Mo. 
2003) (en banc)). 
 8. Habeas Corpus, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/habeas_corpus# [perma.cc/6VNM-R73K] (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2019).  In this context, “the law” encompasses constitutional, 
statutory, and common law. 
 9. Lincoln, 517 S.W.3d at 23. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. at 16.  
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procedural gap that allows innocents to be lawfully and constitutionally 
detained, even for life. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
On the night of April 27, 1982, a man entered the home of JoAnn Tate.12  
The man assaulted and murdered Ms. Tate before he turned his attention to 
her two daughters, Melissa, age seven, and Renee, age four.13  The “bad man,” 
as Melissa would later call him, sexually assaulted and repeatedly stabbed 
both girls before he left.14  Concerned that no one had heard from her the 
morning after the assault, JoAnn’s brother and boyfriend both set out to check 
on her.15  Upon arriving at her apartment, the two men discovered the horrific 
crime scene.16  That morning, Melissa told them the man who committed the 
assaults had also worked on her mother’s car recently.17  She called him 
“Bill.”18  She also told authorities the man drove a white Volkswagen.19 
As investigators attempted to identify a suspect for the crimes, they 
repeatedly asked Melissa for additional information about her assailant.20  
Eventually, law enforcement created a composite drawing of a suspect based 
on Melissa’s descriptions.21  A few of JoAnn’s relatives thought the composite 
resembled one of JoAnn’s old romantic interests, Rodney Lincoln.22  A 
detective met with both girls to view a photographic lineup and a live lineup 
that included Lincoln.23  Both the lineups were conducted in a highly 
suggestive manner using techniques that are considered unreliable today.24  
The detective told the girls that he had a magic door the “bad man” was 
 
 12. J. Malcom Garcia, Reasonable Doubt, LATTERLY (March 29, 2018), 
https://latterly.org/reasonable-doubt/ [perma.cc/FDF3-KLYM]. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id.  
 19. In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11, 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); Affidavit 
of Melissa DeBoer, MIDWEST INNOCENCE PROJECT, 3–4 (Nov. 30, 2015), 
https://themip.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/M.D.-Letter-Requesting-Clemency-
for-Rodney-Lincoln-redacted.pdf [perma.cc/J39N-JJGC]. 
 20. Affidavit of Melissa DeBoer, supra note 19, at 2–3. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Garcia, supra note 12. 
 23. Id.  
 24. See Eyewitness Identification: A Policy Review, THE JUST. PROJECT, 
https://web.williams.edu/Psychology/Faculty/Kassin/files/Justice%20Project%20-
%20on%20ET.pdf [perma.cc/9FY8-NAFA].  “The Special Master also found that ‘[a] 
witness’s age . . . bears on the reliability of an identification.’ A meta-analysis has 
shown that children between the ages of nine and thirteen who view target-absent 
lineups are more likely to make incorrect identifications than adults.” State v. 
Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 906 (N.J. 2011). 
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behind.25  He also told them the “bad man” was in one of the pictures and 
emphasized that it was important to pick a photo so the “bad man” would not 
go free.26  The photographic lineup contained only two photos: an outdated 
mugshot of Mr. Lincoln and one of the girls’ relatives, who was another 
person of interest.27  At only four years old, Renee would not look at the 
photos.28  Seven-year-old Melissa picked Mr. Lincoln.29  Later the same day, 
Melissa was presented with a live lineup of four individuals – Mr. Lincoln and 
three men who looked remarkably unlike him.30  Mr. Lincoln was the shortest 
in the lineup and was thinner than his co-suspects.31  His hair was short and 
clean cut while the others had longer, shaggy haircuts.32  All of the men had 
varying facial hair.33  Melissa identified Mr. Lincoln just as she had in the 
photographic lineup.34   
At trial, when Melissa was called to testify, she smiled at Mr. Lincoln 
and even moved towards him on her way to the witness stand.35  This behavior 
discredited the notion that Mr. Lincoln was the perpetrator of a violent assault 
on the little girl and contributed in large part to a hung jury.36  Before the 
retrial, prosecutors and social workers coached Melissa extensively on her 
 
 25. Garcia, supra note 12.  Lineups should be completed in a double-blind 
manner. Eyewitness Identification, supra note 24, at 7–8. 
 26. Affidavit of Melissa DeBoer, supra note 19, at 2. 
 27. Id.  Photographic lineups should include at least 5 fillers and live lineups 
should include at least 4 fillers. Eyewitness Identification, supra note 24, at 3. 
Photographic lineups should also be presented sequentially. Id. 
 28. Id.   
 29. J. Malcom Garcia, Reasonable Doubt, LATTERLY (March 29, 2018), 
https://latterly.org/reasonable-doubt/ [https://perma.cc/FDF3-KLYM]. 
 30. Affidavit of Melissa DeBoer, supra note 19, at 3.  Ms. DeBoer’s affidavit 
contains a photo of the lineup. Id. at 4.  Fillers should always resemble the witness’s 
prior descriptions. Eyewitness Identification, supra note 24, at 3. Furthermore, the 
suspects should all look as similar as possible so that no one suspect stands out.  
Eyewitness Identification, supra note 24, at 3.  The other three men looked remarkably 
different from Mr. Lincoln. Affidavit of Melissa DeBoer, supra note 19, at 4.  A vital 
element of reliable lineup procedures requires that the witness be told the actual 
perpetrator may not be in the lineup.  Eyewitness Identification, supra note 24, at 3; 
see also State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 913 (N.J. 2011). 
 31. Affidavit of Melissa DeBoer, supra note 19, at 4. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Affidavit of Melissa DeBoer, supra note 19, at 3.  Viewing a suspect more 
than once during an investigation can affect the reliability of the later identification. 
State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 900 (N.J. 2011).  “The problem, as the Special 
Master found, is that successive views of the same person can make it difficult to know 
whether the later identification stems from a memory of the original event or a 
memory of the earlier identification procedure.”  Id. 
 35. Garcia, supra note 12.   
 36. Id.  
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testimony.37  Department of Family Service (“DFS”) records would later 
reveal that following her attack, Melissa identified most men in her life as the 
“bad man.”38  Melissa remembers that she was coached to stop saying her 
attacker was “Bill” and to identify Mr. Lincoln instead.39  She received so 
much coaching that Mr. Lincoln was the “bad man” that she now believes her 
memory was altered.40   
At the second trial, the substantive evidence against Mr. Lincoln 
consisted of Melissa’s more polished eye witness identification and expert 
testimony concerning a pubic hair found on a blanket in JoAnn’s room.41  The 
expert testified that the hair “matched” Mr. Lincoln’s.42  While hair testimony 
of this nature was once acceptable in a court proceeding, the “science” of hair 
matching has been debunked so extensively that expert testimony concerning 
hair “matches” is no longer admissible evidence at trials.43  At the close of the 
second trial, the jury convicted Mr. Lincoln of manslaughter and two counts 
of first-degree assault.44  He was sentenced to fifteen years on the 
manslaughter count and life imprisonment on each assault count, with each 
term to run consecutively.45  
 
 37. Rodney Lincoln, MIDWEST INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://themip.org/clients/rodney-lincoln/ [perma.cc/B6UT-X4HX] (last visited Dec. 
15, 2019).  
 38. Petitioner’s Motion to Transfer at 5, In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 
11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (No. WD79854). 
 39. Letter from Melissa DeBoer to Jeremiah Nixon, Governor of Mo., & 
Members of the Bd. of Prob. and Parole, (Dec. 5, 2016), https://themip.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/M.D.-Letter-Requesting-Clemency-for-Rodney-Lincoln-
redacted.pdf [perma.cc/J39N-JJGC]. 
 40. Id.  
 41. In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11, 18 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). 
 42. Id. at 15.  
 43. Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand Goals, 
Tragic Flaws, and Judicial Gatekeeping, 44 JUDGES’ J. 16, 20–21 (2005).  It is not 
possible to say with any degree of scientific integrity that two sets of hairs came from 
the same person.  Id. at 20.  Even findings that hairs are similar have a substantial rate 
of error.  Id.  In fact, in 2015, the FBI formally acknowledged the problems with hair 
matching, stating that twenty-six out of twenty-eight examiners overstated hair 
findings ninety-five percent of the time over two decades. Spencer S. Hsu, After FBI 
Admits Overstating Forensic Hair Matches, Focus Turns to Cases, WASH. POST (Apr. 
20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/after-fbi-admits-overstating-
forensic-hair-matches-focus-turns-to-cases/2015/04/20/a846aca8-e766-11e4-9a6a-
c1ab95a0600b_story.html. [perma.cc/DH78-CN89].  As a result, the FBI began 
reviewing cases containing unfounded expert testimony concerning hair that 
undoubtedly has contributed to a significant number of wrongful convictions.  Id. 
 44. Lincoln, 517 S.W.3d at 15. 
 45. Id.  Consecutive sentences mean the jail sentences run back to back rather 
than at the same time (concurrently). Consecutive Sentence, LEG. INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/consecutive_sentence#. [perma.cc/98P5-TMBQ]. 
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On direct appeal to the Western District, Mr. Lincoln argued the trial 
court abused its discretion when it found Melissa competent to testify.46  To 
determine Melissa’s competency, the trial court applied a four-part test to 
discern whether she possessed: 
(1) [a] present understanding of or intelligence to understand, on 
instructions, an obligation to speak the truth; (2) [the] mental capacity 
at the time of the occurrence in question truly to observe and to register 
such occurrence; (3) memory sufficient to retain an independent 
recollection of the observations made; and (4) capacity truly to 
translate into words the memory of such observation.47 
Mr. Lincoln’s argument rested on the notion than an eight-year-old 
(Melissa’s age at the time of trial) could not retain an independent recollection 
of her observations of an incident.48  The Western District noted the trial court 
correctly implemented the four-part test to determine Melissa’s competency 
to testify.49  Because the trial court applied the correct test, the Western 
District granted deference to the trial court’s finding without further 
explanation.50  Mr. Lincoln’s conviction could not be disturbed, as the trial 
court’s finding of competency was not an abuse of discretion.51 
In 2012, thirty years after the original crime, Mr. Lincoln secured DNA 
testing of the pubic hair identified as a “match” to him at trial.52  The DNA 
tests proved conclusively that the hair did not belong to Mr. Lincoln.53  
However, the court reviewing the DNA results (the “DNA court”) concluded 
the pubic hair was not the “determinative factor” in Mr. Lincoln’s 
conviction.54  Because the court viewed Melissa’s eyewitness testimony as the 
linchpin in the convictions, it found the DNA test did not establish Mr. 
Lincoln’s innocence.55  His request to be released was denied.56 
In 2015, after viewing a Crime Watch Daily episode about her mother’s 
murder and the assaults on her and her sister,57 Melissa recanted her 
 
 46. State v. Lincoln, 705 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).  Mr. Lincoln 
also argued that testimony of Renee’s behavior at the photo lineup was wrongly 
admitted into evidence. Id. The appellate court found that this testimony was 
cumulative and therefore not prejudicial to the defendant. Id. at 579. 
 47. Id. at 578 (citing Hildreth v. Key, 341 S.W.2d 601, 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960)). 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.   
 52. Lincoln v. State, 457 S.W.3d 800, 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014). 
 53. Id. at 804.  
 54. Id. at 808.  
 55. Id. The finding of the motion court was affirmed on appeal. Id. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Rodney Lincoln Case: Crime Writer Challenges Decades-Old Conviction, 
TRUE CRIME DAILY (Nov. 23, 2015 10:39 AM), 
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eyewitness identification of Mr. Lincoln.58  The documentary identified an 
alternative perpetrator, a serial killer named Tommy Lynn Sells.59  Sells 
claimed to have committed his first murder at age sixteen60 and went on to kill 
over seventy more people across the country before he was finally caught in 
Texas.61  At least four people, including Lincoln, were convicted and 
subsequently released for murders that Sells committed.62  Sells’ pattern 
consisted of breaking into a random house, typically around four a.m., and 
using a knife from the kitchen to stab and assault his victims.63  Sells was in 
St. Louis working for a relative who owned a Volkswagen repair shop near 
Ms. Tate’s home at the time of her murder and the girls’ assaults.64  Melissa 
says she recognized Sells as her true attacker when she saw him on the Crime 
Watch Daily episode.65  Given her identification of Sells as her attacker, 
Melissa began working diligently for Mr. Lincoln’s exoneration and release, 
believing him to be innocent.66 
After Melissa’s recantation, none of the evidence used to convict Mr. 
Lincoln remained intact.  It was now clear that Mr. Lincoln was, in fact, 
innocent.  Mr. Lincoln petitioned the state court for a writ of habeas corpus 




 58. Garcia, supra note 12. 
 59. Rodney Lincoln Case, supra note 57; Garcia, supra note 12.  Sells was 
executed in Texas in 2014 for the murder of a thirteen-year-old girl. Garcia, supra 
note 12.  During this attack, Sells assaulted and stabbed the thirteen-year-old girl as 
well as her ten-year-old friend, slashing both of their throats before leaving. Id.  The 
ten-year-old survived the attack. Id. 
 60. MICHAEL NEWTON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SERIAL KILLERS 235 (2d ed. 2006). 
 61. Id. at 237.  Texas authorities announced on February 7, 2001 that they 
believed Sells was responsible for approximately seventy murders across the United 
States. Id. 
 62. See Julie Rea, BLUHM LEG. CLINIC: CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/il/jul
ie-rea.html [perma.cc/PM6B-2XVG] (last visited Dec. 16, 2019); Jennifer S. Mann, 
Victim Recants ID That Put Man in Prison for Mother’s Murder in St. Louis in 1982, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 1, 2015), 
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/victim-recants-id-that-put-
man-in-prison-for-mother/article_503a9500-b913-5a2f-b655-ff822f62f917.html 
[perma.cc/GXN7-DT4D].  Because his crimes lasted decades and spanned the 
country, there are bound to be more innocent individuals serving time for Sells’ 
crimes.  
 63. Rodney Lincoln Case, supra note 57; Mann, supra note 62. 
 64. Rodney Lincoln Case, supra note 57. 
 65. Letter from Melissa DeBoer to Jeremiah Nixon, supra note 39; see also 
Rodney Lincoln Case, supra note 57. 
 66. Garcia, supra note 12. 
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adequate trial.67  The trial court denied his petition.68  Mr. Lincoln then 
petitioned the Western District for a writ of habeas corpus on the same 
grounds.69  The court first addressed Mr. Lincoln’s alleged constitutional 
violations.70  Finding none, the court denied all claims depending on a 
constitutional violation to prevail.71  Mr. Lincoln’s petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus would have to rest on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.72  Even 
though none of the evidence used to convict Mr. Lincoln remained, the court 
denied his freestanding claim of actual innocence on a procedural technicality 
– a freestanding claim is exclusively reserved for defendants facing a death 
sentence.73  Even when an incarcerated defendant not on death row illustrates 
a compelling case of actual innocence, innocence alone is insufficient to grant 
a writ of habeas corpus.74 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The general purpose of habeas corpus is to give detainees of a 
government the right to challenge their detention as unlawful in court.75  
Habeas corpus has been a foundational principle of criminal justice since the 
Magna Carta was signed in 1215.76  At the United States’ inception, the 
Founders drafted the Suspension Clause into the Constitution which states, 
“The Privileges of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended unless 
when in Cases of Rebellion of Invasion the public Safety may require it.”77  
While the Suspension Clause prevents suspension of habeas corpus rights, it 
does not create an individual right to habeas corpus relief.78  Federal and state 
statutes create the right for citizens to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.79  
Because the right to habeas corpus derives from distinct sources at the state 
and federal level, the right varies from state to state as well as from state to 
federal courts.80  In the case of criminal convictions, courts granting habeas 
 
 67. In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11, 16–18 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).  He 
alleged three constitutional violations: Brady violations, ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and a violation of due process. Id. at 17–18. 
 68. Id. at 16.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 17.  
 71. Id. at 18.  
 72. Id. at 15–16.  
 73. Id. at 20–24.  
 74. Id. at 23.  
 75. Habeas Corpus, supra note 8. 
 76. Id.  
 77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 78. Habeas Corpus, supra note 8. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
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relief vacate the conviction of the petitioning defendant.81  Because the 
conviction is vacated, defendants are released from custody.82 
In Missouri, the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted 
by Missouri Supreme Court Rule 91.01(b), which states, “Any person 
restrained of liberty within this state may petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
to inquire into the cause of such restraint.”83  The Missouri Constitution 
delineates an unqualified suspension clause, which states, “[T]he privilege of 
the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended.”84  Missouri’s common 
law provides three avenues for habeas relief: (1) on the basis of a jurisdictional 
issue, (2) upon demonstration of “cause and prejudice,” or (3) when a 
“manifest injustice” would result unless habeas relief is granted.85  The 
“manifest injustice” prong is grounded in the notion that the continued 
detention of a citizen would be a manifest injustice when a constitutional 
violation contributed to the detention.86   
Prior to State ex rel Amrine v. Roper, Missouri jurisprudence provided 
only for “gateway” claims to permit review of alleged constitutional 
violations under the “cause and prejudice” and “manifest injustice” prongs of 
habeas corpus.87  A “gateway” entitles a petitioner to “review on the merits of 
. . . otherwise defaulted constitutional claim[s].”88  Without proof of a 
qualifying gateway, even a meritorious constitutional violation is insufficient 
to constitute a manifest injustice warranting habeas relief.89  So, in order to 
establish the right to habeas relief, the petitioner must demonstrate both the 
gateway itself as well as a constitutional violation – neither alone provide a 
path to habeas relief. 
There are two “gateways” that permit a court to consider the underlying 
constitutional violation: (1) “actual innocence” under the manifest injustice 
prong and (2) the “cause and prejudice” prong itself.90  If a defendant can 
demonstrate his innocence, the gateway is opened for the court to review 
alleged constitutional violations that occurred at trial.91  The burden pertaining 
to innocence does not require the negation of  all evidence that supported the 
conviction at trial. 92  Instead, the defendant must show “it is more likely than 
 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. MO. SUP.  CT. R. 91.01(b) 
 84. MO. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
 85. In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11, 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016), transfer 
denied, (citing State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Mo. 2003) (en 
banc)). 
 86. Id. at 16–17. 
 87. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 88. Lincoln, 517 S.W.3d at 17 (quoting State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 
S.W.3d 541, 546 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)). 
 89. Id. (citing Clay v. Dormire, 37 S.W.3d 214, 217 (Mo. 2000) (en banc)). 
 90. Id. at 16–17. 
 91. Id. at 17.  
 92. Id.  
9
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not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the defendant.”93  The 
“actual innocence” gateway is based on the premise that it would be a manifest 
injustice not to review the constitutionality of a trial if the defendant is 
innocent. 94  The gateway of “cause and prejudice” requires both a valid cause 
for failing to raise an issue in a timely manner and a showing of prejudice as 
a result of that failure.95  In other words, if the defendant can show that he or 
she was not responsible for missing the original habeas corpus deadline but 
his or her claims of constitutional violations are valid, the gateway is open for 
the court to review those claims. 96  Because gateway claims require both the 
presence of the gateway and a constitutional violation, defendants who are 
able to establish their innocence but not a constitutional violation at trial do 
not qualify for habeas relief.   
The Supreme Court of Missouri first recognized a freestanding claim for 
habeas relief when it decided Amrine.97  In 2003, Joseph Amrine’s execution 
date was already set when the Supreme Court of Missouri requested a hearing 
concerning Mr. Amrine’s motion for a stay of execution.98  Mr. Amrine’s trial 
did not contain constitutional deficiencies that contributed to his 
incarceration.99  Rather, Mr. Amrine was convicted based on the testimony of 
three jailhouse informants, all of whom later recanted their testimony and 
cited compelling reasons for their original perjury.100  Two additional facts 
reinforced Mr. Amrine’s innocence: (1) no physical evidence tied Mr. Amrine 
to the crime, and (2) circumstantial evidence showed Mr. Amrine could not 
possibly have committed the murder.101  The problem for Mr. Amrine was 
that no judicial procedure existed for him to establish his innocence in court 
and secure his freedom.102  Because he could not show a constitutional 
violation adversely affected his trial, habeas relief was unavailable to Mr. 
Amrine.103   
The Supreme Court of Missouri responded to considerable political 
pressure by scheduling a hearing in Mr. Amrine’s case.104  In its subsequent 
opinion, the court expanded habeas corpus relief to include a freestanding 
 
 93. Id. (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 332 (1995) (Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Mo. 2003) 
 98. Alexandra Gross, Joseph Amrine, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Jul. 
23, 2015), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?ca 
seid=2993 [perma.cc/4ZSH-F3UW].  
 99. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 545–46. 
 100. Id. at 544–45. 
 101. Id. at 548–49. 
 102. Id. at 547.  
 103. Id. at 546–47.  
 104. Gross, supra note 98. 
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claim of actual innocence.105  The court recognized the urgency the execution 
of an innocent person warrants saying, “[I]t is incumbent upon the courts of 
this state to provide judicial recourse to an individual who . . . is able to 
produce sufficient evidence of innocence to undermine . . . confidence in the 
underlying judgment that resulted in defendant’s conviction and sentence of 
death.”106  The court emphasized the execution of an innocent person would 
be a manifest injustice and reversed Mr. Amrine’s conviction.107  The court 
delineated that a freestanding claim of actual innocence dispenses with the 
two-step “gateway” and “constitutional violation” analysis and declares that 
innocence itself is enough to show that continued detention would be a 
manifest injustice warranting habeas relief.108  Innocence is established when 
no credible evidence remains to support the original conviction.109  In Lincoln, 
however, the Western District held that the freestanding claim of actual 
innocence is only available when the petitioner has been sentenced to death.110  
In non-death penalty cases, innocence is limited to serving as a gateway to 
review of otherwise procedurally barred claims of constitutional violations at 
trial.111  Even though an incarcerated person may have demonstrated his actual 
innocence, his continued detention is not legally considered a manifest 
injustice warranting habeas relief on its own.112 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION  
In his petition to the Western District, Mr. Lincoln argued three distinct 
grounds for habeas corpus relief: (1) a gateway claim of actual innocence, (2) 
a gateway claim of “cause and prejudice,” and (3) a freestanding claim of 
actual innocence.113  To support his claim of innocence, Mr. Lincoln 
emphasized that no evidence remained to support his conviction.114  At trial, 
the two pieces of substantive evidence used to convict Mr. Lincoln consisted 
of the pubic hair “match” and Melissa’s eyewitness identification.115  Because 
DNA evidence conclusively rebutted the hair “match” and Melissa recanted 
her testimony, none of the evidence used to convict Mr. Lincoln remained.  
The lack of evidence against him combined with affirmative evidence of his 
 
 105. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 547. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 547–49.  Before Mr. Amrine could be released, the prosecutor insisted 
on testing “blood” evidence that it previously claimed had been destroyed. See Amrine 
v. State, 785 S.W.2d 531, 535 (Mo. 1990) (en banc). The DNA tests came back 
negative altogether – the substance wasn’t blood at all.  It was paint. 
 108. Id. at 546–47. 
 109. Id. at 548–49. 
 110. In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11, 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). 
 111. Id. at 20–23.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 16.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 15.  
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innocence116 was more than sufficient to support Mr. Lincoln’s assertion of 
actual innocence. 
Mr. Lincoln argued three separate constitutional violations occurred at 
his trial.117  Mr. Lincoln alleged Brady violations,118 in particular suppression 
of the DFS records concerning Melissa’s uncertainty in her identification of 
Mr. Lincoln and detailing extensive coaching of Melissa prior to her 
testimony at trial.119  He alleged a constitutional violation via ineffective 
assistance of counsel stemming from failure to fully impeach Melissa’s trial 
testimony and failure to acquire the DFS records.120  He also argued the faulty 
forensic evidence based on the hair “match” constituted a due process 
violation.121  The court was not convinced by any of these claims.   
To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show the prosecution 
suppressed favorable evidence resulting in prejudice to the defendant.122  
While the information in question was undoubtedly favorable to Mr. Lincoln’s 
case, the suppression and prejudice elements were disputed.123  The court 
found the alleged Brady material to be cumulative of information already 
available to the defense, specifically that Melissa originally identified her 
assailant as “Bill.”124  The court also found that Melissa was extensively cross-
examined concerning the inconsistency of her identification.125  Because Mr. 
Lincoln already knew and used the information at trial, the court reasoned he 
could not have been prejudiced by suppression of the DFS records.126  On both 
the alleged Brady violation and the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
the court found no constitutional violations.127   
The court also held Mr. Lincoln did not meet his burden to establish a 
due process violation as a result of faulty forensic evidence, citing the DNA 
court’s finding that the hair “match” was not the linchpin of his conviction.128  
Without a constitutional violation, both of Mr. Lincoln’s gateway claims for 
 
 116. Mr. Lincoln had a solid alibi verifiable by many witnesses. Garcia, supra note 
12. 
 117. Lincoln, 517 S.W.3d at 17–18.  
 118. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) 
 119. Lincoln, 517 S.W.3d at 17–18. 
 120. Id. at 18.  
 121. Id. at 17.  
 122. Id. at 18. Favorable evidence can be either exculpatory or impeachment 
evidence. Id.  Suppression need not be willful. Id.  Prejudice requires a showing that 
suppression of the favorable evidence undermines the validity of the verdict.  Id. at 19 
(quoting State ex rel. Woodworth v. Denney, 396 S.W.3d 330, 338 (Mo. 2013) (en 
banc)). 
 123. Id. at 19.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 19–20.  
 128. Id. at 18.  
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habeas corpus relief failed.129  His only remaining argument was the 
freestanding claim of actual innocence, which does not require a constitutional 
violation but instead rests on the premise that it is a manifest injustice to 
continue incarcerating a person who has demonstrated his innocence.130   
In denying Mr. Lincoln’s petition for habeas relief, the Lincoln court 
completed an extensive evaluation of Amrine.131  The court noted that Amrine 
emphasized the manifest injustice that would occur if the state executed an 
innocent person.132  However, Amrine did not address whether it is a manifest 
injustice to merely incarcerate an innocent person for life.133  Amrine also 
failed to address whether either punishment, e.g., execution or incarceration 
of an innocent person, would violate the Missouri Constitution.134  As a result, 
the Lincoln court determined that whether or not a due process violation 
occurs when an innocent is executed or incarcerated is unresolved altogether: 
“It thus remains an open and unanswered question whether either the 
continued incarceration or execution of a person who clearly and convincingly 
establishes his actual innocence after a constitutionally adequate trial violates 
due process, warranting habeas relief . . . .”135  Because these questions went 
unaddressed in Amrine, the Lincoln court found that the freestanding claim of 
actual innocence established by Amrine was limited to capital cases stating, 
“Amrine cannot be read . . . to have broadly recognized a freestanding claim 
of actual innocence in non-death penalty cases.”136  
Applying the law as established by Amrine, the court denied Lincoln’s 
freestanding claim for habeas relief.137  Habeas corpus relief is available when 
the detention in question amounts to a violation of the constitution or laws of 
the state or federal government.138  The court noted that Mr. Lincoln’s 
incarceration as a person having demonstrated actual innocence did not 
violate a current state or federal statute because no law prohibits the continued 
incarceration of an innocent if he was convicted at a trial void of constitutional 
violations.139  Without a written law explicitly prohibiting his continued 
detention, the only remaining, possibly viable argument was Mr. Lincoln’s 
assertion that his incarceration constituted a due process violation.140  The 
court’s narrow construction of Amrine as having left unanswered whether 
incarceration or even execution of an innocent person is a due process 
 
 129. Id. at 20.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 20–23.  
 132. Id. at 21. 
 133. Id. at 22.  
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. (emphasis excluded). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 23.  
 138. Id. at 16.  
 139. Id. at 23.  
 140. Id. 
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violation was dispositive of Mr. Lincoln’s argument.141  According to the 
court, the Supreme Court of Missouri has not determined the incarceration of 
an innocent is a due process violation, and therefore the court could not find 
that Mr. Lincoln’s incarceration was a violation of due process either.142  
While recognizing the strength of Mr. Lincoln’s claim of innocence, the court 
stated it did not have the authority to extend the application of Amrine to non-
capital cases: “In short, no matter how compelling [Lincoln’s] argument may 
be, we are constrained to afford habeas relief only as authorized.”143  
In a footnote, the court advised that Mr. Lincoln could seek clemency 
from the governor as a remedy for his incarceration as an innocent person 
– that is, petition the governor for a pardon or commutation of his sentence.144  
Citing Herrera v. Collins,145 it recognized executive clemency as the 
traditional remedy when new evidence is discovered too late for relief through 
the courts.146  The court seemingly accepted that Mr. Lincoln was innocent 
but took a limited view of Amrine, refusing to grant relief to an innocent 
person in a non-death penalty case.  The court ultimately found Amrine did 
not establish precedent from the Supreme Court of Missouri that incarceration 
of an innocent person is either a manifest injustice or a constitutional due 
process violation.147 
V.  COMMENT 
Time and again, the Supreme Court of Missouri has lauded that 
“[h]abeas corpus is the last judicial inquiry into the validity of a criminal 
conviction[,]”148 and it serves as “a bulwark against convictions that violate 
 
 141. Id. at 22.  
 142. Id. at 23.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 24 n.12.  
 145. 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). 
 146. Lincoln, 517 S.W.3d at 24 n.12. 
 147. Id. at 23. The Supreme Court of Missouri denied Mr. Lincoln’s request for 
transfers.  In 2018, Governor Greitens commuted Mr. Lincoln’s sentence to time 
served.  Rachel Rice, A Week of Freedom: Rodney Lincoln, His Murder Sentence 
Commuted, Adjusts to Lie After 36 Years Behind Bars, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH 
(Jun. 13, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/a-week-of-
freedom-rodney-lincoln-his-murder-sentence-commuted/article_cde8c8d7-90a9-
5053-a0bc-27e0536377ff.html [perma.cc/C5B8-NYF0].  Greitens released a 
statement saying, “Rodney Lincoln was wrongly convicted of capital murder and has 
served 34 years in prison for a crime he did not commit.  DNA evidence and one 
eyewitness were used to convict him.  Now, we know the DNA evidence was wrong 
and the eyewitness – the daughter of the victim – says he is innocent and wants him 
to be free.” Joe Millitzer, Gov. Greitens Announces Pardons and Clemency Decisions 
Before Resignation, FOX2 NOW: ST. LOUIS (Jun. 1, 2018), 
https://fox2now.com/2018/06/01/gov-greitens-announces-pardons-and-clemency-
decisions-before-resignation/ [perma.cc/N6F6JA24]. 
 148.  State ex rel. Carr v. Wallace, 527 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Mo. 2017) (en banc). 
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fundamental fairness.”149 The “bulwark against . . . fundamental fairness” 
language originated with the Supreme Court of the United States,150 where the 
concept of fundamental fairness has a robust history.151  Fundamental fairness 
incorporates protections into due process, even when they are not explicitly 
stated in the text.152  “The standard query in such cases is whether the 
challenged practice or policy violates ‘a fundamental principle of liberty and 
justice which inheres in the very idea of a free government and is the 
inalienable right of a citizen of such government.’”153  The requirement that 
the prosecution prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt is one such 
requirement created under the doctrine of fundamental fairness.154  Under the 
umbrella of fundamental fairness, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
extended the protection of due process to remedy unfair sentencing schemes, 
faulty jury instructions, and rules that keep a defendant from wearing non-
prison clothing in front of a jury.155  All of these causes are worthy of the 
attention and protection they have received, but their holdings beg the 
question: if due process can protect a defendant from wearing prison orange 
in front of a jury, how does it not protect an innocent person from a life 
sentence?  According to both the Supreme Court of the United States and the 
Supreme Court of Missouri, finality is the reason for limiting habeas corpus 
so stringently, and executive clemency alone is the remedy for innocent 
persons who find no relief in the courts.156 
A.  Finality is an Inadequate Justification 
Courts often describe the government’s interest in finality as vital to the 
integrity of the judicial system.157  Finality contributes to efficiency in the 
court system, enhances the quality of judicial rulings, and preserves the 
balance between state and federal power.158  Finality is also said to increase 
 
 149. State ex rel. Woodworth v. Denney, 396 S.W.3d 330, 337 (Mo. 2013) (en 
banc); see also State ex rel. Clemons v. Larkins, 475 S.W.3d 60, 76 (Mo. 2015) (en 
banc); State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 150. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 443 
U.S. 72, 97 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 151. See generally, The Principle of Fundamental Fairness, LEG. INFO. INST. 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/section-1/generally-
the-principle-of-fundamental-fairness#fn1080amd14 [perma.cc/93AB-LV46] (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2019). 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908)). 
 154. Id. at n.1078. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993); In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 
S.W.3d 11, 23 (2016). 
 157. Todd E. Pettys, Killing Roger Coleman: Habeas, Finality, and the Innocence 
Gap, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2313, 2336 (2007). 
 158. Ellyde Roko, Finality, Habeas, Innocence, and the Death Penalty: Can 
Justice Be Done?, 85 WASH. L. REV. 107, 121 (2010). 
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public confidence in court outcomes.159  The interest in finality is so 
paramount to other interests that when a court speaks of finality as relevant to 
the case at hand, the party seeking to disrupt the judgment almost always 
loses.160  Finality has also been used with increasing frequency as a 
justification for limiting review of criminal judgements.161  The result is that 
finality trumps fairness where habeas is concerned.162  Not only has fairness 
been forced to submit to the interest of finality, the volume of precedent 
extolling finality has overwhelmed the reality of other public and private 
interests that oppose it.   
Multiple significant interests of the private individual, the public, and 
the government weigh against the government’s interest in finality.  The 
government’s interests in the integrity of the judicial system and the public 
perception of that integrity are both put at risk when an innocent is denied a 
remedy.  When the plight of an incarcerated innocent reaches the public, word 
spreads through the news and social media as advocacy grows for the one 
wrongfully convicted.  Skepticism of the system increases when court 
procedure creates barriers to commonsense justice.  Finality as an objective, 
legal fact is not intuitive or even logical to the public, especially when an 
innocent is facing severe punishment.163  As a practical matter, “[F]inality is 
exceptionally difficult to achieve in the face of reasonable suspicions of 
innocence,”164  and even more difficult to achieve in the face of indisputable 
evidence of innocence.  Habeas corpus procedure that does not account for 
the public’s understandable response to the plight of an innocent is poorly 
calculated to protect the public and government interest in the integrity of the 
judicial and criminal justice systems.165 
Not only is there strong government and public interest in disturbing a 
final judgment when it has been proven to be seriously flawed, there are 
compelling private interests in justice and liberty weighing against finality as 
well.  The Supreme Court of the United States has acknowledged that liberty 
is one of the strongest private interests granted by the Constitution.166  This 
interest governs common law concerning pre-trial detention and post-
conviction sentencing.167  Suddenly, this interest is forgotten when an 
innocent person challenges his conviction without an additional, distinct 
constitutional violation.168  The Supreme Court of the United States has also 
 
 159. Pettys, supra note 157, at 2336–37.  
 160. Id. at 2341.  
 161. Roko, supra note 158, at 113. 
 162. Id.  
 163. Pettys, supra note 157, at 2341–42.  
 164. Id. at 2343.  
 165. Id. at 2352.  
 166. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 US. 833, 848 (1992); 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970). 
 167. See, e.g., Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 
391 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
 168. Pettys, supra note 157, at 2341–42. 
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instructed that the duty of a prosecutor, and impliedly the purpose of the 
criminal justice system, is not in acquiring convictions but rather in finding 
truth and justice.169  This interest is also forgotten when it comes to challenges 
of debunked convictions.170 
Private interests in liberty and justice are compounded when the 
disparity between innocents who acquire justice and those who do not is 
governed solely by procedure.  What difference is there between an innocent 
whose conviction was obtained through a trial free from constitutional 
violations and an innocent who was convicted at a trial containing prejudicial 
constitutional violations?  What difference is there between an innocent 
sentenced to death and an innocent sentenced to die in prison via a life 
sentence without the possibility of parole?  The only real differences among 
them are based in legal procedure.  All innocent people deserve justice from 
their government and the liberty afforded by the Constitution.  No innocent 
deserves the degradation of their humanity resulting from incarceration or 
execution.  Yet, legal procedure only offers relief to some innocents while 
leaving others without remedy.  Legal procedures serve an important function 
in both the criminal justice and civil systems, but procedure should not be a 
barrier to justice.  When it is, the Constitution and the values fundamental to 
liberty and democracy demand a remedy.  
Given the strong government and public interests in the integrity of the 
judicial and criminal justice systems, as well as the private interests in liberty 
and justice, it is baffling that the interest in finality wins the day in the face of 
overwhelming evidence of innocence.  The emergence of DNA testing in 
forensic science has forced us to confront the fact that even fair trials 
sometimes produce very wrong results.  We now know that wrongful 
convictions are much more common than anyone would have guessed just 
thirty years ago.171  This is true even when there is a lack of physical evidence 
to produce a DNA exoneration.172  While finality might demand a high barrier 
to overturning a result produced by a seemingly fair trial, if the defendant can 
overcome that high hurdle and demonstrate convincingly, as in this case, that 
he is actually innocent, finality must yield to truth. 
B.  Clemency is an Ineffective and Unreliable Remedy 
Both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 
Missouri have suggested that executive clemency is the remedy for an 
 
 169. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 170. Pettys, supra note 157, at 2327–28. 
 171. As of October 31, 2019, The National Registry of Exonerations has recorded 
2,509 exonerations since the first DNA exoneration in 1989. Exonerations by Year: 
DNA and Non-DNA, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-Year.aspx 
[perma.cc/5BAH-CNR7] [hereinafter Exonerations by Year] (last visited Dec. 17, 
2019). 
 172. Id.  
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innocent person who finds no remedy in the courts.173  Yet, multiple problems 
prevent clemency from serving as an effective remedy for incarcerated 
innocents – problems that are the natural result of a system never intended to 
handle innocence claims.174  The power of clemency has been and continues 
to be a function of political expediency rather than an accessible or significant 
remedy for those suffering an injustice.175  Executives grant clemency most 
often during their final days in office – when political consequences have 
evaporated and they no longer risk the accountability power of constituents at 
the polls.176  As such, executives have not focused their clemency power on 
remedying wrongful convictions through any strategic or structured system.177  
It is naïve to believe that a power so political can be trusted to reliably 
guarantee justice.   
In addition to this, the procedures necessary to acquire clemency are 
riddled with obstacles including a lack of transparency, biased boards 
administering the procedures, and the absence of motivation or incentive to 
address the injustice of wrongful convictions.178  Defendants who apply for 
clemency are afforded little constitutional protection in the application 
process.179  Such protection, if available at all, typically focuses on access to 
the application process rather than substantive standards of due process 
throughout application procedures, and courts have proven reluctant to 
interfere with even the “most troublesome” clemency procedures.180  So, 
while the courts continue to laud clemency as a remedy for wrongful 
convictions, clemency procedures have not been adapted or reformed to 
become an effective corrective justice function.181  
Clemency generally has not been an effective remedy for innocents, and 
that story is no different in Missouri.  The Missouri governor’s clemency 
power is derived from Missouri Constitution Article IV Section Seven which 
states, “The governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations and 
pardons, after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of 
impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations 
as he may deem proper, subject to provisions of law as to the manner of 
applying for pardons.”182  Missouri’s clemency procedures are saturated with 
 
 173. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993); In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 
517 S.W.3d 11, 24 (2016). 
 174. Sarah Lucy Cooper, The State Clemency Power and Innocence Claims: The 
Influence of Finality and its Implications for Innocents, 7 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 51, 
107–08 (2015). 
 175. Id.; Sarah Lucy Cooper & Daniel Gough, The Controversy of Clemency and 
Innocence in America, 51 CAL. WESTERN L. REV. 55, 72 (2014). 
 176. See Cooper, supra note 174, at 92–93. 
 177. Cooper & Gough, supra note 175, at 109. 
 178. Cooper, supra note 174, at 107–08. 
 179. Cooper & Gough, supra note 175, at 109–10. 
 180. Id.  
 181. Cooper, supra note 174, at 108. 
 182. MO. CONST. art. IV, § 7. 
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the same problems outlined above.  First, Missouri’s clemency is limited in 
several ways.  For example, a person who has been denied executive clemency 
within the past three years is barred from submitting a clemency application 
again.183  A clemency board within the Department of Corrections investigates 
clemency applications and forms recommendations, which are relayed to the 
governor.184  This process is neither free from bias nor entirely transparent.  
The governor also retains full discretion concerning to whom and when he 
will grant executive clemency, perpetuating the political expediency that 
prevents clemency from being a reliable remedy to wrongful convictions.185  
Not only is clemency difficult to acquire through the unpredictable and 
biased process, clemency is an imperfect solution even when it is granted.  
After losing in the courts, Mr. Lincoln turned his attention and efforts to 
clemency.  Mr. Lincoln was denied clemency by Governor Nixon.186  
Fortunately for Mr. Lincoln, while mired in scandal, Missouri’s fifty-sixth 
Governor left office after only sixteen months.187  On his final day in office, 
Governor Greitens commuted Mr. Lincoln’s sentence to time served.188  Mr. 
Lincoln spent nearly two additional years in prison after the Western District 
denied his habeas corpus claim before he was finally granted relief.189  If 
Governor Greitens had not been relieved of the political pressure to appeal to 
his constituents as a result of political scandal, Mr. Lincoln might still be 
incarcerated.   
In his statement announcing several pardons and commutations, 
Greitens cited Mr. Lincoln’s innocence as the reason for the commutation, 
stating that Mr. Lincoln was wrongfully convicted.190  If Mr. Lincoln had been 
granted habeas corpus relief, his conviction would have been reversed.191  
However, because Governor Greitens merely commuted Mr. Lincoln’s 
sentence, he has not been legally exonerated for the heinous crimes.192  His 
conviction still stands and appears on his criminal record.193  Because the 
conviction still stands, so do all of the collateral consequences of a felony 
 
 183. MO. BD. OF PROBATION & PAROLE, The Executive Clemency Process in 
Missouri, MO. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, https://doc.mo.gov/sites/doc/files/2018-
01/Clemency_Brochure.pdf [perma.cc/E4FX-3Z69] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.  
 186. Rodney Lincoln, supra note 37. 
 187. Id.  
 188. Id.  
 189. The Western District issued its ruling denying Mr. Lincoln’s habeas corpus 
petition on October 11, 2016. Governor Greitens commuted Mr. Lincoln’s sentence 
on June 1, 2018. 
 190. Millitzer, supra note 147. 
 191. The state could still choose to re-prosecute him.  After thirty-four years and 
a total lack of evidence, it’s unlikely the state would take that route and even more 
unlikely he would be convicted if the state did re-prosecute. 
 192. See supra note 190.   
 193. Rodney Lincoln, supra note 37. 
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record.194  He is also ineligible for any sort of compensation for his wrongful 
conviction.195  A commutation does not come close to restoring a person to 
the position they were in prior to conviction by the mere fact that it does not 
reverse or expunge the conviction from the innocent’s record, let alone its 
failure to address the physical, mental, and emotional toll a wrongful 
conviction and incarceration exacts on an innocent, his loved ones, and his 
community.   
C.  Real Remedies for the Constitutional Paradox 
The Lincoln court believed its hands were tied regarding the justice it 
could provide Mr. Lincoln, but were its options really so limited?  The court 
read Amrine in a very narrow manner, finding that the freestanding claim of 
actual innocence was available only for those facing the death penalty.196  But 
Amrine could just as easily have been read more broadly.  Amrine extolled the 
virtues of habeas corpus as a stop gap to detentions that violate fundamental 
fairness.197  The opening paragraph to the majority opinion in Amrine states: 
Because the continued imprisonment and eventual execution of an 
innocent person is a manifest injustice, a habeas petitioner under a 
sentence of death may obtain relief from a judgment of conviction and 
sentence of death upon a clear and convincing showing of actual 
innocence that undermines confidence in the correctness of the 
judgment.198 
Given the opening clause to this holding sentence, it is illogical and arbitrary 
to assert that even though continued imprisonment of an innocent person is a 
manifest injustice, habeas relief is available only to those sentenced to death.   
Furthermore, when the Amrine court addressed the insufficiency of 
preexisting remedies warranting the expansion of habeas relief to freestanding 
claims of actual innocence, it noted precedent failed to account for compelling 
cases of actual innocence independent of constitutional violations at trial.199  
The court said this failure was “all the more true” in death penalty cases but 
not exclusive to death penalty cases.200  As Judge Michael A. Wolff stated in 
his concurring opinion to Amrine, “Both the principal opinion and the dissents 
 
 194. See generally Colleen F. Shanahan, Significant Entanglement: A Framework 
for the Civil Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387 
(2012). 
 195. See, e.g., Ariel Rothfield, Missouri Man Freed from Prison May Not Receive 
Any Compensation, KSHB 41 (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.kshb.com/news/local-
news/missouri-man-freed-from-prison-may-not-receive-any-compensation 
[perma.cc/87R6-HANX]. 
 196. In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11, 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). 
 197. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).  
 198. Id. (emphasis added) 
 199. Id. at 547.  
 200. Id.  
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recognize that the state court’s writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy 
in cases of actual innocence.”201  The concurring and dissenting judges in 
Amrine did not disagree with the majority opinion concerning the availability 
of habeas corpus for the actually innocent but rather on the form and extent of 
the remedy and on factual issues in Mr. Amrine’s case.202  When all of the 
Amrine opinions are read thoroughly, they convey an obvious message: the 
Supreme Court of Missouri believes continued detention of innocents is a 
manifest injustice for which there should be a state court remedy.   
Special Master for the Supreme Court of Missouri, Darrel E. Missey, 
recently weighed in on the Western District’s opinion.203  The Supreme Court 
appointed Judge Missey to evaluate a habeas corpus petition that included a 
freestanding claim of actual innocence for a defendant not on death row.204  In 
his report to the court, Judge Missey carefully detailed his interpretation of 
Amrine and its applicability to non-death penalty defendants.205  In the end, 
Judge Missey respectfully disagreed with the Lincoln court:  
There is no reasonable argument that an innocent petitioner’s 
incarceration for life does not qualify as a ‘manifest injustice.’ Only 
the most tortured logic could yield the conclusion that [a non-death 
penalty defendant] must continue to serve a life sentence but would 
[walk] free if only he had been sentenced to death.  There is no basis 
in law or reason for such a distinction to be made.206 
Judge Missey concluded that the petitioning defendant should be eligible 
for a freestanding claim of actual innocence.207  He also found that 
constitutional violations at the defendant’s trial qualified him for gateway 
claims.208  The Supreme Court agreed with Judge Missey that constitutional 
violations established a gateway claim for habeas relief and ruled solely on 
these grounds.209  As a result, the court did not adopt or address Judge 
Missey’s recommendation for the availability of the freestanding claim for 
non-death penalty defendants.210   
 
 201. Id. at 549 (Wolff, J., concurring). 
 202. E.g., whether to order a new trial, appoint a special master, or order Mr. 
Amrine be released. Id. at 549–52 (Wolff, J., concurring; Benton, J., and Price, J., 
dissenting). 
 203. See Master’s Report to the Supreme Court of Missouri and Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, In re Robinson v. Cassady (2018) (No. SC95892). 
 204. Id. at 3.  
 205. Id. at 73–74.  
 206. Id. at 74.  
 207. Id. at 90.  
 208. Id.  
 209. See Kathy Sweeney, Sikeston, MO Man Released, Charges Dismissed Nearly 
18 Years After Murder Conviction, KFVS.COM (Aug. 14, 2018), 
https://www.kfvs12.com/story/38087260/sikeston-mo-man-released-charges-
dismissed-nearly-18-years-after-murder-conviction/ [perma.cc/22ZA-UGB2]. 
 210. Id. 
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In addition to the language of the Supreme Court of Missouri is Supreme 
Court of the United States precedent regarding fundamental fairness.  
Remember, fundamental fairness is violated when jury instructions are faulty 
and when a defendant is forced to wear prison garb in front of the jury.211  The 
Lincoln court could have employed this broader view of fundamental fairness, 
relative to the incarceration of an innocent person, to reach the commonsense 
conclusion that it is in fact a violation of fundamental fairness and as such, a 
violation of due process to continue to detain an innocent person.  The only 
risk of so holding would have been that the Supreme Court of Missouri 
accepted transfer and reversed.212  The overwhelming benefit would have 
been filling a significant gap in legal procedure that is a barrier to justice for 
innocents.  While the Lincoln court failed to fill this gap, it continues to be an 
option available to state courts in Missouri. 
Not only is this remedy available to Missouri courts, at least seven states 
permit review of freestanding claims of actual innocence for all defendants as 
a matter of common law precedent.213  Connecticut, Texas, Illinois, Florida, 
and South Dakota have all extended the freestanding claim of actual 
innocence to capital and non-capital defendants alike, holding that it would be 
a constitutional violation of due process to deny a procedural avenue for 
innocents to challenge their incarceration or execution.214  The Supreme Court 
of Connecticut held extension of habeas relief to freestanding claims was 
required to bring habeas corpus procedures in line with the demands of law 
and justice.215  The Supreme Court of Connecticut went on to say that even 
the interest in finality is not a strong enough government interest to defeat a 
claim of actual innocence because the continued incarceration of innocents 
 
 211. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.  
 212. In a law review article following Amrine’s decision, Missouri Supreme Court 
Judge Laura Denvir Stith argued that states are not beholden to follow federal habeas 
corpus precedent. Honorable Laura Denvir Stith, A Contrast of State and Federal 
Court Authority to Grant Habeas Relief, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 432 (2004).  She 
made the case that state courts are free to broaden habeas relief to freestanding claims 
of actual innocence. Id.  She recognized that Missouri created the freestanding claim 
for capital defendants, but she did not address why it has not applied more broadly to 
any defendant that can demonstrate innocence. Id.  “[O]ur prior cases have recognized 
that habeas corpus relief is available to prevent manifest injustice. . . . Amrine then 
stated, ‘It is difficult to imagine a more manifestly unjust and unconstitutional result 
than permitting the execution of an innocent person.’” Id. 
 213. See John M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts’ Approaches 
to a Constitutional Right of Actual Innocence: Is There a Need for a State 
Constitutional Right in the New York in the Aftermath of CPL § 440.10(1)(G-1)?, 76 
ALB. L. REV. 1453, 1471–81 (2013). 
 214. Engesser v. Young, 856 N.W.2d 471, 481–82 (2014); People v. Washington, 
665 N.E.2d 1330, 1337 (Ill. 1996); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1996) (en banc); Summerville v. Warden, State Prison, 641 A.2d 1356, 
1368 (Conn. 1994); Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991). 
 215. Summerville, 641 A.2d at 1369. 
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would be a fundamental miscarriage of justice demanding a remedy.216  The 
Supreme Court of Illinois has held that remedies should be available under 
habeas corpus as a matter of due process, regardless of the punishment 
imposed.217   
The Supreme Court of Texas found that any punishment would implicate 
federal constitutional violations for innocents saying, “We think it clear . . . 
the incarceration of an innocent person is as much a violation of the Due 
Process Clause as is the execution of such a person. . . . In either case, such 
claims raise issues of federal constitutional magnitude.”218  The Supreme 
Court of Texas arrived at this conclusion by reading the dicta of Herrera v. 
Collins closely and concluding that all nine justices of the Supreme Court of 
the United States (five in the majority and four in the dissent) believe the 
difference in sentence should not change the avenues of relief.219  Both the 
justices who joined the majority opinion and those who joined the dissenting 
opinion of Herrera endorsed comments in those opinions that argue treating 
defendants differently based on the sentence imposed would be 
nonsensical.220  The Supreme Court of Texas latched on to this dicta to justify 
its expansion of habeas corpus relief to all innocents regardless of their 
sentence.221  
Iowa and New Mexico have both adopted the freestanding claim of 
actual innocence, even though the death penalty is not imposed in their 
states.222  The Supreme Court of Iowa did not mince words when it recognized 
the freestanding claim of actual innocence stating, “What kind of system of 
justice do we have if we permit actually innocent people to remain in prison? 
. . . It is time that we refuse to perpetuate a system of justice that allows 
actually innocent people to remain in prison . . . .”223  The Supreme Court of 
Iowa also acknowledged the individual’s interest in liberty and “remaining 
free from underserved punishment” because “[h]olding a person who has 
committed no crime in prison strikes the very essence of the constitutional 
guarantee of substantive due process.”224  The states that still impose the death 
penalty but have adopted a freestanding claim of actual innocence for all 
defendants have come to the commonsense conclusion that a differentiation 
 
 216. Id.  
 217. Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1337. 
 218. Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 205. 
 219. Id.  
 220. “It would be a rather strange jurisprudence, in these circumstances, which 
held that under our Constitution he could not be executed, but that he could spend the 
rest of his life in prison.”  Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 405 (1993). 
 221. Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 205. 
 222. Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 790 (Iowa 2018); Montoya v. Ulibarria, 
142 P.3d 476, 484 (N.M. 2007). 
 223. Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 790. 
 224. Id. at 793; see also Engesser v. Young, 856 N.W.2d 471, 481–82 (S.D. 2014). 
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based on the sentence is arbitrary and unjustified.225  All of these states have 
recognized the serious constitutional implications of continuing to incarcerate 
defendants who demonstrate their innocence and responded accordingly.  
Missouri must do the same. 
While it is well within the discretion of courts to expand habeas corpus 
procedure to freestanding claims of actual innocence, Missouri need not wait 
for courts to respond to this grave injustice.  The Missouri legislature is just 
as capable of exacting a cure as the Supreme Court of Missouri.  The 
alternative remedies to the paradoxical notion that it is lawful and 
constitutional to enforce a life sentence against an innocent person are sewn 
into the foundation of habeas corpus relief.  If habeas corpus relief is a check 
on a detention that violates the constitution and laws of the state, the logical 
cure is to pass a statute that makes it unlawful to detain or execute a person 
who can demonstrate his innocence post-conviction.  This statute could be a 
simple statement to that effect or more tailored to habeas corpus relief in 
particular.  A statute geared at habeas corpus would specifically expand relief 
to freestanding claims of actual innocence regardless of whether the detainee 
is subject to execution, a life sentence, or a term-of-years sentence.  The most 
important takeaway is that the law must be amended, either by common law 
or statutory law, to address the procedural gap that currently exists in habeas 
corpus and allows for such a grave injustice to be perpetuated against 
innocents. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The innocence movement has seen over 2400 exonerations since 
1980.226  This number does not include individuals who have attempted to 
exonerate themselves but failed due to inadequate evidence or procedural 
technicalities such as the one highlighted in this Note.  Given the ever-rising 
number of exonerations, the importance of efficient but accurate habeas relief 
cannot be understated.  The interests that justify maintaining the status quo of 
habeas relief, namely finality, do not survive careful scrutiny.  The judicially 
relied upon remedy of clemency, while somewhat successful for Mr. Lincoln, 
is not a trustworthy friend to innocents and left Mr. Lincoln only partially 
restored.  For these reasons, it is incumbent upon the state that habeas reform 
includes a pathway for freestanding claims of actual innocence regardless of 
the sentence associated with the conviction. 
 
 
 225. See also Montoya, 142 P.3d at 484; Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla. 
1991). 
 226. See Exonerations by Year, supra note 171. 
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